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A Bridge Too Far: When Strategy Becomes Recklessness

by Ram ben Ze'ev



A Bridge Too Far: When Strategy Becomes Recklessness
A Bridge Too Far: When Strategy Becomes Recklessness

As a Jew and someone who places Israel first, I do not shed a tear over the destruction in Iran. The regime in Tehran has spent decades funding terror, threatening Israel with annihilation, and building a regional network of proxies dedicated to Jewish death. If Iran were to launch a direct attack on Israel, I would support the complete destruction of the regime and the dismantling of its military capacity without hesitation. A nation has the absolute right to defend itself, and Israel must never apologise for survival.


However, that principle cuts both ways. Defence is one thing; initiating an unnecessary war is another entirely.


The present war against Iran was launched under circumstances that cannot honestly be described as defensive. Israel and the United States attacked while negotiations were ongoing, negotiations that now appear to have served as little more than a convenient cover while military operations were prepared. The diplomatic process was not merely unsuccessful; it appears to have been a ruse.


The facts surrounding the lead-up to the attack are troubling. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited the White House seven times during the past year, most recently immediately before the strike was launched. When such repeated consultations precede a sudden joint military operation, it is difficult to argue that the war was not long in preparation.


More importantly, the regional situation did not demand it. Since the Gaza ceasefire there had been a period of relative calm. There was no immediate Iranian attack underway. There was no imminent threat that would justify the sudden escalation to a full military confrontation between major powers.


War was chosen.


Now the consequences are unfolding exactly as any serious strategist would have predicted. Iran’s rockets are killing Israelis, injuring hundreds of innocent people, and destroying property. At the same time, Iran has moved to block the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important energy chokepoints in the world. Tehran has already warned that if the West wants oil at $200 per barrel, that is precisely what it will receive. This is not an idle threat. If the strait remains restricted, global energy markets will react violently.


For the United States, that price point would be politically catastrophic. President Trump faces midterm elections, and the American electorate is already deeply divided about the war. Many Americans believe the conflict began without proper Congressional authorisation. Even more concerning is the explanation now emerging from the administration itself.


According to the President's own statements, the decision to act was influenced heavily by what Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner were telling him. Even more extraordinary, the White House press secretary acknowledged that the President simply had a “feeling” that Iran posed a threat.


A feeling is not a casus belli.


A feeling is not justification for killing thousands of people.


A feeling is not justification for the deaths of civilians, including school girls, nor for the deaths of Israelis who are now paying the price for a war that did not need to be fought.


Already the human cost is mounting. Civilians have died. Israeli families are mourning their own losses. Cities have been damaged. Billions upon billions of dollars and shekels are being poured into a conflict whose strategic objective remains unclear.


The tragedy is that this war was avoidable.


Israel has fought many wars for survival. In those moments the moral and strategic calculus is clear. When a nation faces annihilation, hesitation becomes impossible. But when a war is chosen rather than forced, leaders must weigh the consequences with extraordinary caution. That caution appears to have been absent here.


Iran is a dangerous adversary, but it is also a large and resilient country with enormous strategic depth. A direct confrontation carries risks far beyond the battlefield. It affects global trade, energy markets, international alliances, and domestic political stability inside the very countries prosecuting the war.


This is why I believe the current conflict represents a bridge too far for both Israel and the Trump administration.


Washington will eventually step back. American politics will demand it. The economic pressure alone could force the United States to de-escalate, particularly if oil prices surge and voters begin to feel the consequences at the petrol pump and in their monthly bills.


When that moment comes, Israel will be left standing alone in the centre of the storm.

That is the real danger.


My concern is not for Iran’s regime, which has earned the hostility directed toward it. My concern is for Israel. Netanyahu’s senseless determination to destroy Iran may yet produce the opposite result if the war expands beyond Israel’s capacity to control it.


History teaches a painful lesson: nations are rarely destroyed by their enemies alone. They are often weakened first by strategic overreach.


If the United States withdraws from the conflict, as I believe it ultimately will, Israel could find itself facing a prolonged confrontation with a powerful regional adversary without the full backing of its most important ally.


That scenario would not end well for anyone.


Israel must always be strong. Israel must always be prepared to defend itself. But strength also requires judgment, restraint, and the wisdom to recognise when a war that could be fought should not be fought.


This war may prove to be the moment when strategy gave way to recklessness.


And if that is the case, the consequences could reach far beyond Iran.



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